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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ating the car has his consent, and whether used in his business or not,
thus creating a liability where none existed before the enactment.7
However, the statute has no extra-territorial effect.8 It does not come
into operation until an accident happens on a public highway in this
state.9 Where the accident occurs in another state, the law of that
state applies in an action for the recovery of damages for negligence.10
In the absence of any evidence as to the law of the foreign state, it
will be presumed to be the same as the common law of the state where
the action is brought." Thus, in the instant case, Section 59 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law, not being a restatement of the common law,
does not apply, and the owner is not responsible for the tort of the
driver.
Although there was a bailment between father and son, it was a
gratuitous one, and no such contract resulted 12 as would allow plain-
tiffs to sue as third-party beneficiaries. 13
J.K.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATUTE ABOLISHING
CAUSES OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY AND SEDUC-
TION.-Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for a breach of promise to
marry, and seduction, the acts alleged in the complaint occurring
subsequent to the enactment of Article 2-A of the New York Civil
Practice Act.' At Trial Term, a verdict was directed for the defen-
dant on the grounds that the cause of action had been abolished by
statute. The judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Division,
which held that the statute, in so far as it applies to this case, is con-
stitutional. On appeal, held, affirmed. The legislature has plenary
power in dealing with the subject of marriage, and may, in its dis-
cretion, abolish or alter causes of action in relation thereto, when a
condition is deemed to exist that is detrimental to the best interests
' Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 347, 178 N. E. 553, 554 (1931).
8 Kernan v. Webb, 50 R. I. 394, 399, 148 Atl. 186, 188 (1929).
0 Ibid.
"Metcalf v. Reynolds, 267 N. Y. 52, 195 N. E. 681 (1935).
1 Matter of Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 303,
169 N. E. 386, 392 (1929); Weissman v. Banque De Bruxelles, 254 N. Y. 488,
495, 173 N. R. 835, 837 (1930).
"2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 1039. Professor Williston, in dis-
cussing loans for bailee's use without hire, says, "Here as in that case there is
likely to be no true contract * * *. There is * * * the possibility-of a contract
as the parties bargained for an exchange, but generally this will not occur."
"1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 394 (1924). "The foundation of any right the
third person may have whether he is a sole beneficiary or a creditor of the
promisee, is the promisor's contract. Unless there is a valid contract, no rights
can arise in favor of anyone."
'N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 263.
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of the institution of marriage. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N. Y. 268,
5 N. E. (2d) 815 (1936).
The general principle in New York and other jurisdictions is
that the contract of marriage is a civil contract.2  But because of the
nature of its subject-matter such a contract is cloaked with a public
interest, and the legislature has power to subject the parties to certain
conditions precedent to the valid execution of the marriage contract.3
It is well settled that the state has the right to require persons to
procure a license, 4 and to fulfill certain conditions as to age,5 and
consanguinity.6 In a contract of marriage, as in any contract bearing
on a social relation, the personal rights of the parties are subordinate
to the general welfare, 7 and the legislature may protect the institution
of marriage from the immoral consequences of "legal blackmail".
The provision of the Federal Constitution safeguarding the obli-
gations of contracts s does not extend to contracts made with respect
to the institution of marriage. 9 In the name of good order and public
morals, the legislature is hampered neither by due process nor the
aforementioned provisions in enacting such legislation as it deems
necessary or expedient.10 The state exercises plenary powers in deal-
ing with the subject of marriage." Unless such powers are unreason-
2 N. Y. Dom. RE.L. LAW (Cons. L. c. 14) art. 3, § 10; 2 SCHOULER, MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DOMEsTIc RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1073;
DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (1903) ; Zeigler v. Cassidy,
220 N. Y. 98, 115 N. E. 471 (1917) ; Coe v. Hill, 201 Mass. 15, 96 N. E. 949(1909); Heymann v. Heymann, 218 Ill. 636, 75 N. E. 1079 (1905); Van
Dommelen v. Van Dommelen, 218 Mich. 149, 187 N. W. 324 (1922).
22 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DomEsTic RELATIONS
(6th ed. 1921) § 1074; Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874) ; Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845 (1921) ; Tyler v. Tyler, 170 Mass.
150, 48 N. E. 1075 (1898).
'N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (Cons. L. c. 14) art. 3, § 13; Blackburn v. Craw-
fords, 3 Vall. 175 (U. S. 1865); Davidson v. Ream, 178 App. Div. 362, 164
N. Y. Supp. 1037 (3d Dept. 1917); Taub v. Taub, 87 N. J. Eq. 624, 101 Atl.
246 (1917).
5N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (Cons. L. c. 14) art. 2, § 7 (1) ; Kellogg v. Kel-
logg, 122 Misc. 734, 203 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1924) ; Peo. v. Souleotes, 26 Cal. A.
309, 146 Pac. 903 (1921).
IN. Y. Dom. REL. LAW (Cons. L. c. 14) art. 2, § 5; Arado v. Arado, 281
Ill. 123, 117 N. E. 816 (1917); Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103, 187 N. Y.
Supp. 652 (1st Dept. 1921).
'Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231
(1932); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921); Peo. v.
Griswold, 213 N. Y. 92, 106 N. E. 929 (1914) ; Matter of Peo. (Tit. Guar. &
Mtge. Co.), 264 N. Y. 69, 190 N. E. 153 (1934).
8 U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 10.
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888); Rast v. Van
Deman, 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370 (1916).
2 0U. S. Coxsr. Amdt. XIV, § 1; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup.
Ct. 124 (1921); Union Dry Goods v. Giorgia, 248 U. S. 372, 39 Sup. Ct. 117
(1919).
=Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888) ; Baker's exec. v.
Kilgore, 145 U. S. 487, 12 Sup. Ct. 943 (1892); State v. Tutty. 41 Fed. 753
(S. D. Ga. 1890) ; Duval v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343 (1891).
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ably used, the legislation so enacted must stand.12  It is not within
the power of the judiciary to question the wisdom or necessity of the
statute.13
In the instant case, the court limited its discussion to those sec-
tions of the statute which were involved.14 The question of seduction,
brought into the case by plaintiff's allegation, was sumiilarily dealt
with by the court. At common law there was no cause of action for
seduction brought by the woman against her seducer.15 Hence there
is no doubt of the legislative power to abolish that cause of action.
The court completely ignored the great wealth of legal and editorial
opinions that have been offered since the enactment of the statute.16
It paid no heed to the popular juridical philosophy that the legislature
cannot validly abrogate a cause of action without replacing it with an
adequate substitute.1 7  Nor did it dwell upon other equally effective
and less radical means of attaining the same result.' 8 After satisfying
itself that the police power of the state was reasonably exercised, the
court placed its stamp of validity on this much discussed statute.
In the recent case of Han fgarn v. Mark,19 the Appellate Division,
Second Department, ruled that the legislature went beyond its powers
in abrogating the causes of action for alienation of affections and
criminal conversation, without substituting therefor an adequate rem-
edy.2° The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal on a
technicality of procedure,2 1 but the result of the reargument before
" Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934) ; Matter ofStubbe v. Adamson, 220 N. Y. 459, 116 N. E. 372 (1917) ; Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1932).
"- Williams v. Mayor, 289 U. S. 398, 53 Sup. Ct. 431 (1932).
u4 Section 61-h of the present article provides that it shall be liberally
construed, and if any clause, sentence, paragraph or part thereof shall be found
invalid under any condition or circumstance, such judgment shall not affect the
remainder of the article, nor the application of that part found invalid to other
conditions or circumstances.
' Hamilton v. Lomax, 6 Abb. Pr. 142, 25 Barb. 615 (N. Y. 1858) ; Pickle
v. Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 650 (1930); Graham v. Wallace, 50 App.
Div. 101, 63 N. Y. Supp. 372 (4th Dept. 1900); Welsind v. Scheuller, 98 Minn.
475, 108 N. W. 483 (1906).
'.
6N. Y. L. J., Apr. 9, 1936, p. 1792, col. 3; id., Aug. 19, 1936, p. 456, col. 1.
See also Note (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rxv. 417; Note (1936) 5 FORDHAm L. REv.
63; Dixon, Penal Provisions of the New "Heart Bah" Legislation (1936) 10
ST. JOHNS L. REv. 236.
'. Hanfgarn v. Mark, 248 App. Div. 325, 289 N. Y. Supp. 143 (2d Dept.
1936). See New York Cen. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247
(1916); Gibbs v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 54 Sup. Ct. 140 (1932); Crane
v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 42 Sup. Ct. 214 (1922).
". It has been suggested that the extension of the Statute of Frauds (N. Y.
PF s. PRop. LAW § 31) so as to include mutual promises to marry, would sub-
stantially decrease the number of fraudulent actions.
"s 248 App. Div. 325, 289 N. Y. Supp. 143 (2d Dept. 1936).
' New York Cen. R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247(1916) ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903 (1885). But
see dissenting opinions per Davis and Adel, JJ., in Hanfgarn v. Mark, 248 App.
Div. 325, 330 et seq., 289 N. Y. Supp. 143, 149 et seq. (2d Dept. 1936).2272 N. Y. 265, 5 N. E. (2d) 386 (1936).
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that tribunal promises to be of great interest in view of the conflicting
opinions on the subject in the lower courts.
E. F. A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-DELEGATION
TO PRESIDENT OF POWER To DECLARE EMBAIuGo.-Pursuant to the
authority vested in him on May 28, 1934, by a Joint Resolution of
Congress,1 the President issued a proclamation 2 prohibiting the sale
of munitions in the United States or its territories, to any of the
countries engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco. To an indictment
charging defendants with conspiracy to sell machine guns to one of
the belligerents, defendants demurred on the ground that the Joint
Resolution is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it effects an invalid dele-
gation of legislative power to the executive. On appeal from a judg-
ment sustaining the demurrer,3 held, judgment reversed. The legis-
lation was aimed at regulating foreign relations and not domestic
affairs, and as such it is not repugnant to the Federal Constitution.4
The United States of America v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al.,
- U. S. -, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (1936).
Perhaps no other phase of Constitutional Law has aroused greater
national controversy during the present administration than the ques-
tion of the delegation of legislative power to the Executive. On two
momentous occasions r the Supreme Court struck a lethal blow at the
very vitals of the President's "New Deal Program". It reiterated in
no uncertain terms the principle enunciated in the maxim "Delegata
potestas non potest delegar??'-delegated powers may not be delegated.
The instant case, however, differs from its antecedents in that it
1 "Resolved * * * that if the President finds that the prohibition of sale of
arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged
in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace
between those countries, and * * * if he makes proclamation to that effect, it
shall be unlawful to sell * * * any arms or munitions of war * * * until other-
wise ordered by the President or Congress." 48 STAT. 811 (1934).248 STAT. 1744 (1934).
' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export., 14 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y.
1936).
'Art. I, § 1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." Article I, § 8, par. 18 provides that Congress shall have the
power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof."
SPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935)
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. 5. 495, 55 Sup. Ct.
837 (1935). Of course in these decisions another vital issue played a greatpart-the question whether t  co s themselves would be constitution l, h d
they been formulated by Congress itself, leaving the President to fill in the
details.
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